Ph.D. in Economics
I have a Ph.D. from at the University of Connecticut and a deep interest in exploring the causes and effects of the increases in inequality seen across the world in the past few decades. My current work looks at fertility, intergenerational transfers and estate taxation as potential mechanisms driving increases in wealth inequality. I am interested in using calibrated general equilibrium macroeconomic models and econometric techniques to answer these questions.
The positive effects of micro-loans on the impoverished has become veritable gospel to economic development professionals. Pioneered by Muhammed Yunus in the 1970s, the concept of making small loans to groups of poor entrepreneurs has become a mainstream tool of development and poverty reduction agents around the globe. However, little research has been done at this time into the microeconomic mechanics of small scale finance, especially the different outcomes of the loan depending on what sector of the economy the debtor is engaged in. A simulation designed to pursue further understanding of this subject, and conducted in partnership with Opportunity International, a micro-finance NGO, and the Westmont Investment Club, reveals whether different outcomes of a micro-loan were caused by a debtor's location in the production chain.
Increasing income and wealth disparity in the United States has prompted a renewed focus on the mechanism of inequality. A major puzzle of this phenomenon is that wealth inequality is more pronounced than income inequality. This paper contributes to the literature by studying the impact on wealth inequality from savings, bequests, and fertility differences between rich and poor. We find that bequests have a significant impact on wealth inequality and the fertility difference between the rich and the poor amplifies the impact of bequests. In addition, we find that life-cycle saving and anticipated bequests interact with each other, and this interaction is important for fully understanding wealth inequality in the United States.
The most recent US election revealed large differences in beliefs about the optimal structure of the United States estate tax regime. The contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of differing methods of taxing intergenerational transfers, in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. This paper is the first to consider the impact of switching from an estate to inheritance tax in the presence of endogenous fertility, and the fallout such a switch would have upon inequality and welfare.
The central question of this paper is what effect an increase in risk in the private labor market has on the public labor market. This paper’s hypothesis is that in times of economic distress and recession, the expected quality of individuals who are hired in low risk occupations increases. Using data from the American Community Survey, North Carolina Education Data Research Center and The National Bureau of Economic Research, I find recession-caused migration into the public education profession, document sorting on an observable measurement of teacher ability and find that recession hired teachers have higher value-added scores.
There is no doubt that high levels of intrastate conflict are devastating for an economy. A clearer understanding of what attributes affect the level of violence that economies and societies endure could be a critical turning point in attempting to defuse future conflicts before they happen. Police actions, terror campaigns, ethnic cleansing, and civil war between opposed conflict groups leads to lives lost, increased medical costs, infrastructure destroyed, technological regression, lowered confidence, drops in foreign investment, population displacement, and permanent damage to individual quality of life. The main question this paper attempts to answer is: would rational actors engage in violent behavior, and if so, why? At the core of this approach to conflict is the understanding that violence happens or does not happen as a result of two opposing forces. First is the additional economic power that a conflict group can obtain through violence, through control of critical resources and governmental apparatus. Second is the asset destruction caused by intrastate violence.
Below is a collection of my code that has broader application than my specific research. Please cite me if you use it for your own project. My research specific code is availiable on request.
In a single word, my teaching philosophy revolves around incentives. Students need to have the incentive to learn the subject, attend class and excel on evaluations. To this end I have instituted several policies to ensure that my teaching constitutes an productive approach.
Department of Economics
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Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Phone : 860-576-8738
Website : aaronjcooke.github